Evolutionary game on a stochastic growth network

In some real complex systems the structures are difficult to map or changing over time. To explore the evolution of strategies on these complex systems, it is not realistic enough to specify their structures or topological properties in advance. In this paper, we address the evolutionary game on a stochastic growth network adopting the prisoner’s dilemma game. We introduce a growing rate q$q$ to control the ratio of network growth to strategy evolution. A large q$q$ denotes that the network grows faster than strategy evolution. Simulation results show that a fast growing rate is helpful to promote the average payoffs of both cooperators and defectors. Moreover, this parameter also significantly influences the cooperation frequency on the resulting networks. The coexisting mechanisms in this paper may provide a beneficial insight for understanding the emergence of complex topological structures and game behaviors in numerous real systems.     

Age-related vitality of players promotes the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Within most real biological or social systems, age plays an important role in the vitality of individuals. For instance, individuals become more and more weak with age, while young individuals may prosper even under poor living conditions. In this paper, we find that aging as a coevolutionary process promotes cooperation more effectively than quenched heterogeneous distributions of age. By studying the average age of defectors and cooperators along the boundaries separating the domains of the two strategies, we reveal the significance of coevolutionary rules for the successful evolution of cooperation amongst selfish and unrelated individuals.     

The emergence of leadership in social networks

We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with most agents following the choice made by a few agents. We find a suitable parameterisation which highlights the universal aspects of the behaviour and which also indicates where results depend on the type of social network.     

Word diversity can accelerate consensus in naming game

In this paper, we introduce word diversity that reflects the inhomogeneity of words in a communication into the naming game. Diversity is realized by assigning a weight factor to each word. The weight is determined by three different distributions (uniform, exponential, and power-law distributions). During the communication, the probability that a word is selected from speaker's memory depends on the introduced word diversity. Interestingly, we find that the word diversity following three different distributions can remarkably promote the final convergency, which is of high importance in the self-organized system. In particular, for all the ranges of amplitude of distribution, the power-law distribution enables the fastest consensus, while uniform distribution gives the slowest consensus. We provide an explanation of this effect based on both the number of different names and the number of total names, and find that a wide spread of names induced by the segregation of words is the main promotion factor. Other quantities, including the evolution of the averaging success rate of negotiation and the scaling behavior of consensus time, are also studied. These results are helpful for better understanding the dynamics of the naming game with word diversity.     

Proof of a conjecture on game domination

Let G(V, E) be a simple, undirected graph where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. A b‐dimensional cube is a Cartesian product I₁×I₂×···×I_b, where each I_i is a closed interval of unit length on the real line. The cubicity of G, denoted by cub(G), is the minimum positive integer b such that the vertices in G can be mapped to axis parallel b‐dimensional cubes in such a way that two vertices are adjacent in G if and only if their assigned cubes intersect. An interval graph is a graph that can be represented as the intersection of intervals on the real line—i.e. the vertices of an interval graph can be mapped to intervals on the real line such that two vertices are adjacent if and only if their corresponding intervals overlap. Suppose S(m) denotes a star graph on m+1 nodes. We define claw number ψ(G) of the graph to be the largest positive integer m such that S(m) is an induced subgraph of G. It can be easily shown that the cubicity of any graph is at least ?log₂ψ(G)?. In this article, we show that for an interval graph G ?log₂ψ(G)??cub(G)??log₂ψ(G)?+2. It is not clear whether the upper bound of ?log₂ψ(G)?+2 is tight: till now we are unable to find any interval graph with cub(G)>?log₂ψ(G)?. We also show that for an interval graph G, cub(G)??log₂α?, where α is the independence number of G. Therefore, in the special case of ψ(G)=α, cub(G) is exactly ?log₂α₂?. The concept of cubicity can be generalized by considering boxes instead of cubes. A b‐dimensional box is a Cartesian product I₁×I₂×···×I_b, where each I_i is a closed interval on the real line. The boxicity of a graph, denoted box(G), is the minimum k such that G is the intersection graph of k‐dimensional boxes. It is clear that box(G)?cub(G). From the above result, it follows that for any graph G, cub(G)?box(G)?log₂α?. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Graph Theory 65: 323–333, 2010     

Repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations

We study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments. In every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization. After observing the actual demand, each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers. Residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands, and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit. Unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period. While in a single-shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals, we show that it is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times. We also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers’ order quantities and discount factors when n is large. Finally, we provide conditions under which a system-optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers, and develop a contract for achieving a system-optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied.     

The Shapley value for arbitrary families of coalitions

We address the problem of finding a suitable definition of a value similar to that of Shapley’s, when the games are defined on a subfamily of coalitions with no structure. We present two frameworks: one based on the familiar efficiency, linearity and null player axioms, and the other on linearity and the behavior on unanimity games. We give several properties and examples in each case, and give necessary and sufficient conditions on the family of coalitions for the approaches to coincide.     

An application of cooperative game among container terminals of one port

In this paper a two-stage game that involves three container terminals located in Karachi Port in Pakistan is discussed. In the first stage, the three terminals have to decide on whether to act as a singleton or to enter into a coalition with one or both of the other terminals. The decision at this stage should presumably be based on the predicted outcome for the second stage. The second stage is here modelled as a Bertrand game with one outside competitor, the coalition and the terminal in Karachi Port (if any) that has not joined the coalition. Furthermore, three partial and one grand coalition among the three terminals at Karachi Port are investigated. The concepts of “characteristic function” and “core” are used to analyse the stability of these coalitions and this revealed that one combination does not satisfy the superadditivity property of the characteristic function and can therefore be ruled out. The resulting payoffs (profits) of these coalitions are analysed on the basis of “core”. The best payoff for all players is in the case of a “grand coalition”. However, the real winner is the outsider (the terminal at the second port) which earns a better payoff without joining the coalition, and hence will play the role of the “orthogonal free-rider”.     

On the convergence of Fourier series of computable Lebesgue integrable functions

This paper studies how well computable functions can be approximated by their Fourier series. To this end, we equip the space of L^p‐computable functions (computable Lebesgue integrable functions) with a size notion, by introducing L^p‐computable Baire categories. We show that L^p‐computable Baire categories satisfy the following three basic properties. Singleton sets {f } (where f is L^p‐computable) are meager, suitable infinite unions of meager sets are meager, and the whole space of L^p‐computable functions is not meager. We give an alternative characterization of meager sets via Banach‐Mazur games. We study the convergence of Fourier series for L^p‐computable functions and show that whereas for every p > 1, the Fourier series of every L^p‐computable function f converges to f in the L^p norm, the set of L¹‐computable functions whose Fourier series does not diverge almost everywhere is meager (© 2010 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

基于需求和生产成本偏差的Cournot竞争供应链协调

分析一个供应商和两个Cournot竞争零售商组成的供应链系统的协调问题.首先证明收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链协调;当突发事件导致零售商面临的需求规模和供应商的生产成本同时与其预测值发生偏差时,为使供应链收益最大,提出了调整生产计划和零售价格的协调策略,进一步证明了改进的收益共享合约可协调需求和成本偏差的分权供应链;最后进行了数值实验.